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DEBORAH G. MAYO & ARIS SPANOS, eds. 2009. Error and Inference. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Error and Inference focuses on the error-statistical philosophy of science (ESP) put for-
ward by Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos (MS). Chapters 1, 6 and 7 are mainly written 
by MS (partly with the statistician David Cox), whereas Chapters 2-5, 8, and 9 are 
driven by the contributions of other authors. There are responses to all these contri-
butions at the end of the chapters, usually written by Mayo.  
 The structure of the book with the responses at the end of each chapter is a strik-
ing feature. The critical contributions enable a very lively discussion of ESP. On the 
other hand always having the last word puts Mayo and Spanos in a quite advantageous 
position. Some of the contributors may have underestimated Mayo’s ability to make 
the most of this advantage.  
 Central to ESP are the issues of probing scientiﬁc theories objectively by data, and 
Mayo’s concept of “severe testing” (ST). ST is based on a frequentist interpretation of 
probability, on conventional hypothesis testing and the associated error probabilities. 
ESP advertises a “piecemeal” approach to testing a scientiﬁc theory, in which various 
different aspects, which can be used to make predictions about data, are subjected to 
hypothesis tests. A statistical problem with such an approach is that failure of rejection 
of a null hypothesis H0 does not necessarily constitute evidence in favour of H0. The 
space of probability models is so rich that it is imposible to rule out all other probabil-
ity models.  
 This motivates “severity”. In case that H0 is not rejected by a test T with observed 
data x, severity is deﬁned as the probability that T would have produced a result ac-
cording less well with H0 than x if H0 were false.  
 If this probability is high, it is said that H0 passed a severe test. In a frequentist set-
up, as opposed to a Bayesian one, probabilities are not assigned to epistemic state-
ments like “the theory/hypothesis is true”, but only to observable events assuming a 
true underlying probability model. If a theory is supported by strong evidence accord-
ing to ESP, this does therefore not imply that the theory has a high probability of be-
ing true.  
 “H0 is false” above refers to assuming the “true” underlying distribution in some 
distance of H0. “Distance” is deﬁned in terms of the alternative model against which 
H0 is tested. Distributions not belonging to this model cannot be ruled out. The es-
sence of the “piecemeal” is that a scientiﬁc theory gives rise to various different null 
hypotheses, and various tests of every single one. Additionally to testing H0 within a 
certain model, the model assumptions can be tested (“misspeciﬁcation testing”).  
 Chapter 1 by Mayo and the introductory section by MS give an overview of ESP. 
A major theme is how a piecemeal of local and statistically testable hypotheses can be 
related to a large-scale theory. Bayesian approaches are criticised for the difficulty to 
model a “catch-all alternative” of a theory under investigation.  
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 In Chapter 2 and 3, Alan Chalmers and Alan Musgrave argue from two different 
points of view (emphasising the role of theories in science, and critical rationalism) 
that ST is too strong a demand for high-level theories. Mayo, in her responses, won-
ders whether Chalmers’ arguments reﬂect too much of a “desire to have things set-
tled” instead of accepting that a theory is reliable only as far as it has been severely 
tested, and she denies the necessity of “believing” large-scale theories in order to make 
use of them. She emphasises that ESP is agnostic about scientiﬁc realism.  
 John Worrall, in Chapter 4, states that data needs to be “use-novel” in order to 
constitute evidence in favor of a hypothesis. ESP sometimes requires a double-use of 
data, e.g., when the same data is used for model misspeciﬁcation testing and for infer-
ence within a model. Mayo distinguishes situations where use-novelty is required (to 
prevent hypotheses to be constructed in such a way that the data have no chance to 
contradict them) from where it is not required (where there is no danger of conﬁrm-
ing wrong hypotheses).  
 In Chapter 5, Peter Achinstein defends the assignment of epistemic probabilities to 
hypotheses. Mayo responds that Achinstein’s examples rely on a wrong interpretation 
of error probabilities. Chapter 6 by Spanos is devoted to theory testing in economics 
from an ESP perspective. He discusses the interplay between theory, data and sta-
tistical modeling, and gives a historical overview of the too often neglected role of 
empirical data in economical theory testing.  
 Section I of Chapter 7 (as Section II written by Cox and Mayo) discussed issues in 
the philosophy of statistics. Section II starts off with a paragraph on objectivity (“in-
dependent of our beliefs, biases and interests”). Sufficiency and conditioning in fre-
quentist modelling are discussed and it is denied that there can be really objective 
Bayesian prior distributions. Section III by Mayo contains a remarkable argument 
against a notorious statement of Birnbaum (JASA 57 [1962]) that the strong likeli-
hood principle (SLP) is entailed by two principles that frequentists share. It has been 
claimed that this means that frequentists should not use p-values and Neyman-
Pearson testing, both of which violate the SLP. Mayo shows that Birnbaum’s argu-
ment has two premises that cannot both be true at the same time. Spanos argues in 
Section IV that it is posible to test hypotheses in a logical order in order to arrive at a 
conﬁrmed model. He also states a condition which makes it possible to “double-use” 
data for misspeciﬁcation testing. However, this condition is often not fulﬁlled, and 
Spanos does not mention that fulﬁllment of the condition itself cannot be tested in 
this way.  
 Chapter 8 by Clark Glymour on connections between causal explanations and ST 
is broadly in agreement with MS. Mayo emphasises that she promotes “twin goals of 
severity and informativeness”. Spanos connects the themes of misspeciﬁcation testing 
and structural vs. statistical models to causality. In Chapter 9, Larry Laudan writes 
about an inconsistency in the law system regarding the burden of proof in case of an 
“affirmative defence”. At ﬁrst sight this seems to be remote from the general topic of 
the book, but surprisingly Laudan comes up with the only objection against ESP in 
the book that Mayo does not address convincingly. He points out that clear ac-
ceptance rules and standards of proof are lacking in the philosophy of science. Par-
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ticularly it is not clear what is required to test a theory “severely enough”. In fact, sub-
jective decisions about cutoff values for error probabilities and distances of alterna-
tives from the H0 are required, and one can wonder whether calling a theory “severely 
tested” is as objective as MS imply. Mayo’s response concerns the dependence of such 
decisions on a “cost of errors”, which she calls a “policy or management issue”.  
 A major quality of the book not shared by many philosophical accounts of such is-
sues is the statistical competence of MS backed up by the rich data analytic experience 
of Cox and Spanos. Mayo’s logical elaborations are sharp and convincing. In various 
places she rises metaphilosophical issues beyond standard ESP issues, e.g., the role of 
counterexamples in the philosophy of science. Spanos is well readable, though some-
what repetitive at times.  
 My personal concern with ESP is that its proponents seem to be overoptimistic 
about what it can achieve. I ﬁnd myself in broad agreement with MS regarding the 
practical statistical implications, but less so with their philosophical interpretation. MS 
are somewhat ambiguous regarding the “truth” of models. One one hand, they are 
obviously aware that all probability models are idealisations. On the other hand, they 
often argue as if there is a true model, which can be more or less reliably approximat-
ed using the proposed modelling/misspeciﬁcation routines.  
 MS suggest that models should be tested severely against model misspeciﬁcation, 
but there are no examples in which severity calculations are actually carried out for 
model misspeciﬁcation tests. Such calculations may often not be possible, and para-
metric inference may still fail if misspeciﬁcation tests pass the model. To be fair, MS 
are aware of these issues.  
 Compared with some of the other contributors and other philosophers of science I 
have read on similar issues, particularly Mayo is laudably sceptical and modest about 
what theory testing can achieve. Still I believe that the merits of ESP could be better 
explained in pragmatist terms than in terms of “objective truth”. The Bayesian per-
spective is heavily criticised in the book and it is a pity that there is no contribution by 
a modern Bayesian statistician. Overall, this is a very valuable and thought-provoking 
book which makes a strong case in favour of ESP.  
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JEROEN VAN BOUWEL, ed. 2009. The Social Sciences and Democracy. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
The idea behind The Social Sciences and Democracy is an exciting one: Pulling together 
scholars from philosophy of science, the social studies of science and historians of 
thought to explore the myriad of ways in which democracy and the social sciences are 
related. The connections drawn range from the analysis of groups of scientists as 
democratic communities, to the question of what role social scientists should play in a 
democratic society, on to how social scientific research can inform our normative 
